Studies exploring how students learn and understand science processes such as diffusion and natural selection typically find that students provide misconceived explanations of how the patterns of such processes arise (such as why giraffes’ necks get longer over generations, or how ink dropped into water appears to “flow”). Instead of explaining the patterns of these processes as emerging from the collective interactions of all the agents (e.g., both the water and the ink molecules), students often explain the pattern as being (...) caused by controlling agents with intentional goals, as well as express a variety of many other misconceived notions. In this article, we provide a hypothesis for what constitutes a misconceived explanation; why misconceived explanations are so prevalent, robust, and resistant to instruction; and offer one approach of how they may be overcome. In particular, we hypothesize that students misunderstand many science processes because they rely on a generalized version of narrative schemas and scripts (referred to here as a Direct-causal Schema) to interpret them. For science processes that are sequential and stage-like, such as cycles of moon, circulation of blood, stages of mitosis, and photosynthesis, a Direct-causal Schema is adequate for correct understanding. However, for science processes that are non-sequential (or emergent), such as diffusion, natural selection, osmosis, and heat flow, using a Direct Schema to understand these processes will lead to robust misconceptions. Instead, a different type of general schema may be required to interpret non-sequential processes, which we refer to as an Emergent-causal Schema. We propose that students lack this Emergent Schema and teaching it to them may help them learn and understand emergent kinds of science processes such as diffusion. Our study found that directly teaching students this Emergent Schema led to increased learning of the process of diffusion. This article presents a fine-grained characterization of each type of Schema, our instructional intervention, the successes we have achieved, and the lessons we have learned. (shrink)

In several works on modality, G. H. von Wright presents tree structures to explain possible worlds. Worlds that might have developed from an earlier world are possible relative to it. Actually possible worlds are possible relative to the world as it actually was at some point. Many logically consistent worlds are not actually possible. Transitions from node to node in a tree structure are probabilistic. Probabilities are often more useful than similarities between worlds in treating counterfactual conditionals.

In this article the author investigates the scientific (wetenschappelijk) character of moral statements. First he gives an analysis of the verb ‘to know’ and its equivalents in Dutch. His conclusion is that the verb to know may be, depending on its context, (i) an epistemic qualificator, (ii) a dispositional verb or (iii) a relational verb. Then he deals with the criteria of a scientific system : evidence, relevance, possibility of prediction, of formalisation and finally the criterion of simplicity. The author (...) shows that the latter criterion is the most fundamental. Various formalized ethical systems are developed in this article. The author shows that ethics fulfills all the criteria of science, except the criterion of the possibility of prediction. In ethics one cannot predict without committing the naturalistic fallacy. The author sees scientific systems as logical empirical ones. He demonstrates that ethics can be considered a scientific system, provided that the logic permitted in the system is strong enough (i.e. that it includes deontic logic) and the experience permitted in the system is wide enough (i.e. that it includes ethical intuition). (shrink)

This new edition emphasizes Emerson's philosophy and thoughts on such issues as freedom and fate; creativity and established culture; faith, experience, and evidence; the individual, God, and the world; unity and dualism; moral law, grace, and compensation; and wealth and success. Emerson's text has been fully annotated to explain difficult words and to clarify his references. The Introduction, Notes, Bibliography, Index, and Chronology of Emerson's life help the reader understand his distinctive outlook, his contributions to philosophy, and his place in (...) American culture and society. (shrink)

Peer review of grant applications, it has been suggested, might be distorted by what is popularly termed old boyism, cronyism, or particularism. We argue that the existing debate emphasizes the more uninteresting aspects of the peer review system and that the operation of old boyism, as currently understood would have little effect on the overall direction of science. We identify a phenomenon of cognitive particularism, which we consider to be more important than the institutional cronyism analyzed in previous studies. We (...) illustrate with material drawn from observation of grant-awarding commit tees of the Science and Engineering Research CounciL In the concluding discussion, we explore some of the possible implications for the peer review system. (shrink)

At first sight, the philosophy of Spinoza may seem wholly alien to what is now generally regarded as philosophy in the English-speaking world. For some decades, the dominant trend in that philosophy has been linguistic and anti-metaphysical; the philosopher is held to be concerned with the analysis of language, and not with speculative system-building. Spinoza, on the other hand, is very much a system-builder; as to the analysis of language, he says explicitly that this is of no interest to him. (...) ‘It is not my intention’, he says, ‘to explain the meanings of words; it is my intention to explain the nature of things’. However, the paper which follows will attempt to show that Spinoza’s philosophy is not wholly without relevance today. It will try to do this by placing one of Spinoza’s most important doctrines, his theory of human freedom, within the context of recent discussions. (shrink)

In spite of the seeming heterogeneity of topics in its title - Revolutions, Systems, and Theories - this volume purports to be something more than a random collection of Essays in Political Philosophy. The Colloquium of the Philosophy Department of the University of Western Ontario (29-31 Octo­ ber, 1971) at which initial versions of the first eight papers were delivered was entitled 'Political Theory'; and while the organizers anticipated and indeed welcomed topicality in the issues accorded priority arid in the (...) empirical evidence invoked, they were also hoping for a reasonably comprehensive explorat ion of some of the central issues of political philosophy. For this reason it was quickly decided that in such a field a philosophical focus on clarification of ordering concepts required the suppIement - and test - of researches into more particular subject maUers by social scientists. Thus, to speak in general terms (where the specializatlons and their taxonomies multi­ ply fissiparously!), contributors include political scientists, economists and sociologists (Barnard, Baston, Tullock, Rapoport) as well as philosophers (Scriven, Morgenbesser, Braybrooke, TayIor), and juxtaposed as proponents and commentators ·to generate exchanges across disciplinary frontiers. While the five additional invited papers are alI by professional philosophers, they extend the original Colloquium either by continuing controversy on its funda­ mental issues (e. g., Rubinoff, Nielsen, Roy) or by their continued explorations in what are acknowledged to be boundary areas (e. g., Schick, Wartofsky). The greatest topical emphasis is that on revolution. (shrink)

In this contribution we investigate the conceptual coherence of penal substitution and its moral validity. After assessing two opposing modern contributions, we turn to Reformed and medieval scholasticism. This scholastic manoeuvre sheds additional light on the analytic questions at issue. Following Owen and Scotus in their use of a relational analysis of guilt and its punishment, we argue that penal substitution is conceptually and morally coherent, albeit not univocally vis-à-vis ordinary punishment. Absent from the case of substitution is personal deservedness; (...) herein we follow Murphy. However, this leaves open the conceptual possibility of representative deservedness. (shrink)

Seit 1923 erscheinen in der Sammlung Tusculum ma gebende Editionen griechischer und lateinischer Werke mit deutscher bersetzung. Die Originaltexte werden zudem eingeleitet und umfassend kommentiert; nach der neuen Konzeption bieten schlie lich thematische Essays tiefere Einblicke in das Werk, seinen historischen Kontext und sein Nachleben. Die hohe wissenschaftliche Qualit t der Ausgaben, gepaart mit dem leserfreundlichen Sprachstil der Einf hrungs- und Kommentarteile, macht jeden Tusculum-Band zu einer fundamentalen Lekt re nicht nur f r Studierende, die sich zum ersten Mal einem (...) antiken Autor n hern, und f r Wissenschaftler, die spezifische Aspekte eines Werkes vertiefen m chten, sondern f r alle, die sich durch vertrauensw rdige bersetzungen einen Zugang zur Antiken Welt verschaffen wollen. In der Reihe wurden bisher ber 270 Titel publiziert, alle erh ltlich als Buch und eBook. Dadruch werden bislang vergriffene Titel und Rarit ten wieder vollst ndig verf gbar gemacht. Zus tzlich zu der Buchreihe erscheint bei De Gruyter zum 90-j hrigen Jubil um das eBook-PaketTusculum Online, eine digitale Sammlung aller von 1923 bis 2013 erschienenen Titel -eine geb hrende W rdigung eines wichtigen St cks deutscher Verlagsgeschichte. Mehr Informationen rund um Tusculum erhalten Sie unter: www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)